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States Starting to Offer Legal Protection for Apology
T here is a small trend a-foot in the state legislatures,and a welcome one at that: Providing some legal
protection for people who want to apologize for their role in
a harm, but who are fearful because of the possibility that
their apologies will later be used against them in legal
proceedings.
California recently became the third state to enact such
apology, or "benevolent gestures," legislation, enacting
section 1160 of the California Evidence Code in July 2000.
The state of Texas passed similar legislation in 1999, section
18.061 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Massachu-
setts has had a benevolent gestures law on the books since
1986.
The problem that the legislation seeks to address is
fairly straightforward. People involved in accidents often
feel a need to apologize for the incident, even when they
may not have been fully to blame. While this may be good
for the human spirit, it's historically been bad legal advice
because such statements may plausibly be inferred as an
admission or a statement against interest in a later legal
proceeding. When it comes to the law, you are better off
keeping your mouth shut, despite the toll on the heart.
The anomaly has been the subject of increasing study
by legal scholars in recent years, with at least two major law
review articles published on the topic by prestigious law
schools, Yale and the University of Southern California Law
Center. The author of the first of those pieces, Professor
Jonathan R. Cohen of the University of Florida Levin
College of Law, briefly summarized the issues for Dispute
Resolution Magazine. (See page 16, this issue.)
The California legislation addresses the problem by
amending its existing evidence rules to make "statements,
writings, or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a
general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering,
or death of a person involved in an accident" inadmissible
to prove the speaker's liability in a civil action when they
are made to the victim or the victim's family. However, the
provision also makes clear that routine admissions of
liability are not protected from admissibility.
A simple car accident helps illustrate the point. One
driver says to the other one of three things:
* I am sorry.
It was my fault.
I 1 am sorry. It was my fault.
Under the new California law, the first statement clearly
cannot be used against the speaker in a subsequent
proceeding. The second statement clearly can. What
about the third statement? The apology part is inadmis-
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sible, but the admission part comes in. (Arguably this
could be problematic for the speaker, who may wish a
jury to hear the apology along with the admission.)
In drawing this line, the California law is narrower
than the Massachusetts and Texas measures, neither of
which distinguishes statements of apology from
admissions. In my view, the legislative clarity is helpful
because one may reasonably question how closely
courts will adhere to the more broadly worded Massa-
chusetts and Texas statutes when the rubber hits the
road in a high-stakes case, particularly if the statement is
mixed or ambiguous. The California approach at least
provides sonic guidance, both to those wishing to
apologize and to courts applying the rule in particular
cases.
But this is a relatively minor quibble compared to
the larger importance of the legislation in bringing the
law into alignment with the human condition. May the
other 47 states quickly follow suit!
The Alternative Newsletter has resurfaced a year
after the passing of its founding editor, James B. Boskey.
The new managing editor is Robert Kirkman Collins, a
New Jersey lawyer and adjunct professor at Boskey's
former Seton Hall University School of Law.
The first edition ;% surely a keeper, with tributes to
Boskey by his wife, Adele, and several former col-
leagues, as well as the familiar eclectic mix of ADR news,
cases and legislation of importance, practice standards,
jobs, web sites, calendar information and so on. All of
this material is still available for only $15 per year.
For subscription information and other questions
about The Alternative Newslette; contact Robert Collins
at collinro@shu.edu,
John Lande has succeeded Bobbi MacAdoo as the
director of the University of M issouri-Columbia School
of Law LL.M. program in Dispute Resolution.... Rocco
Scanza, a former American Arbitration Association senior
official, is now executive director of the Alliance for
Education in Dispute Resolution.... David Schwartz, a
law professor at the University of Wisconsin Law
School, has filed an amicus brief on behalf of several
legal scholars (including myself, I must disclose) urging
the U.S. Supreme Court to rule that the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act does not apply to contracts of employment.
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